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The agrarian question and the
development industry in Guatemala
At the beginning of the third millennium,
Guatemala is still confronting the econom-
ic, social, and ethnic conflicts that domi-
nated its history until the end of the 20th
century. This legacy is particularly evident
in the countryside, where poverty is wide-
spread, land inequitably distributed, and
the natural resource base increasingly
degraded. Rural areas are home for 81%
of the 6.3 million Guatemalans living
below the poverty line, and 93% of those
living in extreme poverty. Most of these
people are indigenous campesinos living in
mountain or upland areas and owning hill-
side microfundios of less than two manzanas,
ie 1.4 ha (Figure 1). As these plots are
insufficient to meet family needs, house-
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Since its founding, the United Nations has
included among its goals poverty eradica-
tion, food security, “health for all,” universal
literacy and education, protection of the envi-
ronment, and the end of social discrimina-
tion. Special international mobilizations for
one particular goal (or a particular set of
goals) have taken place several times during
the past 50 years. The UN Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs) movement is the lat-
est and perhaps the most politically commit-
ted of these initiatives. UN summit declara-
tions and subsequent international activism
are beneficial at all levels: as a result of
their momentum, policies are enhanced,
funds raised, and programs implemented.
However, there are sometimes unintended
effects at the field level, where great pres-
sure is put on project managers and staff to
change approaches, invest money, scale up
activities, and get “visible” results in a short
time. The present case study illustrates
such side effects in the context of the FAO
Special Program for Food Security (SPFS) in
Guatemala. The study argues that poverty
and hunger reduction require long-term field-
work and steady impact monitoring, and that
the MDG-related “scaling-up” of development
projects and programs should be adjusted to
the local pace.
FIGURE 1  Hillside with milpa clearings.
(Photo by Patrizio Warren)
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hold farming in Guatemala is intrinsically
“dual.” Millions of campesinos shift season-
ally from the production of staple crops
on their small upland parcels to wage
labor on the lowland plantations. As else-
where in Central America, rural–urban
and international migration are also wide-
spread.
Following the 1996 Peace Agree-
ments, national and local governments
made significant efforts to address the
agrarian question. Hundreds of rural
development projects are being imple-
mented and a controversial “market-
based” land redistribution program is
allotting plots of land to some of the thou-
sands of landless households. However,
these efforts to counter rural poverty have
been hindered by a series of shocks and
negative trends in recent years, including
Hurricane Mitch, a major drought, a drop
in coffee prices, and declining banana
exports. Thus it is not surprising that,
notwithstanding a huge flow of interna-
tional aid, food insecurity has increased in
post-war Guatemala: in 1990–1992, 16% of
Guatemalans were undernourished; by
2000–2002, the proportion of undernour-
ished had risen to 24%.
To address the emergency of increas-
ing hunger in the country, Gran Alianza
Nacional (GANA), the coalition that won
the political elections in February 2004,
specified food security and rural poverty
alleviation as top priorities on the nation-
al political agenda. International agen-
cies and donors, inspired by the MDG
movement, joined the new Government
of Guatemala in this endeavor. The inter-
national effort to improve the lives of
rural Guatemalans included a commit-
ment from the Spanish Agency for Inter-
national Cooperation, Agencia Española de
Cooperación Internacional (AECI), to sup-
port an ambitious “scaling-up” of the
FAO Special Program for Food Security
(SPFS; see Box 1).
SPFS Guatemala and its “good
practices”
During its initial phase (1999–2004), SPFS
was a relatively small program, aimed at
pilot-testing and validating a number of
“good practices” in household food securi-
ty, alternative crop production, livelihood
diversification, and grassroots organiza-
tion in 2 selected locations (Sololá in the
Northern highlands and Jocotán in the
South Eastern hills; Figure 2). In early
2004, during negotiations for the second
phase, the Government, FAO, and the
donor decided to link the program with
MDG 1, ie halving extreme poverty and
hunger (which is explicitly recalled by the
program’s development objective). This
entailed rapidly extending the program
to the 43 most food-insecure municipali-
What is SPFS?
The Special Program for Food Security (SPFS) is FAO’s flagship initiative for reaching the goal of
halving the number of hungry in the world by 2015. Currently, 852 million people in the world face
food insecurity. Through projects in over 100 countries worldwide, the SPFS promotes effective,
tangible solutions to the problems of hunger, undernourishment, and poverty. To maximize the
impact of its work, the SPFS strongly promotes national ownership and local empowerment in the
countries where it operates.
Since 1995, US$770 million from donors and national governments has been invested in FAO-
designed food security programs. The SPFS initiative helps to achieve food security in 2 ways: by
assisting national governments to run focused, well-planned national food security programs, and
by working closely with regional economic organizations to develop regional programs for food
security, which optimize regional conditions for attaining food security in areas such as trade poli-
cy. The SPFS is not a ‘stand-alone’ initiative. The goals and vision that guide the SPFS have been
integrated into major international efforts, including the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Devel-
opment Program of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Food security pro-
grams are also major contributors to achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Source: www.fao.org/spfs/; accessed on 9 November 2005
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ties scattered in 8 different departments
of the country.
Following this decision, some “good
practices” that were partially tested in
Sololá and Jocotán were proposed as
replicable options for action at the new
project sites. Unfortunately, due to tight
institutional deadlines, it was not possible
to complete the on-going good practice sis-
tematización (formative evaluation) before
starting dissemination and replication. By
mid-2004, SPFS management realized that
more information on the socioeconomic
impact of good practices in Sololá and
Jocotán was needed before going ahead
with the scaling-up process. To this end, a
participatory assessment was carried out in
both locations, with the assistance of the
author of the present case study and a
post-graduate development anthropology
student from the University of Rome.
Some of the findings of the Jocotán study
are summarized in the following sections.
The political ecology of campesino
livelihoods in Jocotán uplands
The Municipality of Jocotán, close to the
Honduras border, corresponds to a sub-
catchment of the Copán-Ch’orti’ water-
shed. Its territory is very rugged and
sloped, with altitudes ranging from 300 to
1800 m. The total population is 37,000,
with 5,000 settled in the pueblo (small
town) and 32,000 in a number of small
aldeas (hamlets) scattered in the country-
side. As the overall territory of the munici-
pality is 148 km2, the rural population
density is about 215 inhabitants per km2.
These figures reflect the key problems of
the Jocotán hills: too many people, with
too little land, in a very “dynamic” and
fragile ecosystem.
Following Hurricane Mitch and the
drought of 2001, the Jocotán hills were
often quoted as an example of the high
environmental vulnerability of the
Guatemalan countryside. However, the
root causes of Jocotán’s environmental
degradation (and poverty) should be
sought in the economic and political rela-
tionships that have shaped land tenure
and use throughout history.
During the last 50 years, households in
the Jocotán hills have endured a continual
loss of natural, physical and financial assets
under the pressure of population growth
(2.5% per year in the last 20 years) and a
subsequent increase in land tenure frag-
mentation. The shrinking amount of land
available has led to overexploitation of the
soil and a progressive decrease in yields
(the use of chemical fertilizers has only
partially solved this problem). Moreover, a
lack of cash and labor has made it increas-
ingly difficult for most campesinos to invest
in soil conservation, water harvesting, and
agroforestry activities.
On the other hand, even the patches
of sacred hilltop ocote pine forest (“where
the angeles live”) are being degraded by
“illegal” timber and fuelwood collection.
Vegetation coverage has become inade-
quate to retain rainfall, humidity, and soil.
Delays of one month in the beginning of
the rainy season and the canículas (cessa-
tion of rainfall during the rainy season)
have become increasingly frequent. When
rain falls, huge amounts of fertile sedi-
ment are removed by runoff. The subse-
quent landslides threaten infrastructure,
crops, property, and life.
The development industry in
Jocotán
Since the 1990s, several development proj-
ects have been implemented in Jocotán.
FIGURE 2  Improved varieties of maize
sown for seed multiplication. (Photo by
SPFS Guatemala)
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Buildings, signs, and posters that bear wit-
ness to project activities can be found even
in the most remote aldeas. In town, most
educated people work for some develop-
ment program or institution. Roads and
transport facilities are available in most
aldeas, and access to education and health-
care has significantly improved. Alterna-
tive income-generating activities have also
been promoted and a greater variety of
products and commodities are now
exchanged in the Sunday market. Charity
organizations regularly distribute food aid
to the extremely poor. Many campesino
women claim gender equity. Ch’orti’ cul-
tural identity is being re-vitalized by local
pan-Mayan movement activists. Two local
radio stations, a cable TV station, and 3
Internet cafés connect the pueblo with the
rest of the world (Figure 3). In brief, one
cannot say that efforts to achieve the
MDGs are being spared in Jocotán.
However, the influence of the devel-
opment industry on local consumption
patterns and lifestyles is more visible than
its effects on the campesino household
economy. Since the 1990s, on-farm
income-generating activities—such as
agroforestry, sprinkling irrigation, veg-
etable production, organic manuring, and
courtyard animals—have been promoted
by the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD), FAO, and several
NGOs, and some farmers (not the
extremely poor) have adopted them as
part of a more comprehensive livelihood
diversification strategy. Notwithstanding,
most rural household economies continue
to be based on the dual relationship
between conventional rainfed maize and
bean farming (milpa) for self-consump-
tion, and seasonal wage labor for cash.
Project-promoted enterprises are per-
ceived by most campesinos as sufficiently
bonitas (attractive) to be pursued as an
additional source of petty cash, but not
solid or remunerative enough to sustain
significant change in such a “dual” liveli-
hood strategy.
According to the educated develop-
ment project staff and local government
officers, this cautious attitude has a
FIGURE 3  Jocotán’s satellite
communication facilities and
antenna. (Photo by Patrizio
Warren)
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twofold effect in keeping campesinos in the
poverty trap: on the one hand, the practice
of conventional milpa farming further
degrades the environment and decreases
agricultural carrying capacity; on the other
hand, seasonal migration prevents farming
households from investing time and labor
in land husbandry, water harvesting, agro-
forestry, and “alternative” income-generat-
ing activities. The Ch’orti’ “coolness” (frial-
dad) towards project-promoted innovation
is interpreted as “an attitude typical of
their culture,” an “expression of fatalism,”
and a “lack of entrepreneurial spirit.” For
development workers and government offi-
cers, this Ch’orti’ “mentality” (su mentali-
dad) prevents the campesinos from reaping
the full benefits of new opportunities
offered by development projects.
SPFS “good practices” in
campesino livelihoods
Evidence of the economic performance of
some SPFS-promoted “good practices” in
Jocotán suggests a less “essentialist” and
more controversial version of this story. In
June 2004, when the scaling-up process
gained momentum, SPFS management
asked an agricultural economist to esti-
mate the costs and benefits of selected
good practices.
Based on historical performance data,
this ex-ante economic assessment forecast
an average benefit/cost ratio (B/C) of
1.73 for “greenhouse vegetable produc-
tion” (Figure 4), 1.62 for “agroforestry
plantations,” 1.2 for “improved maize and
bean seed multiplication,” 1.0 for “court-
yard animal modules,” and 0.9 for “cattle
feed production.” Thus, 2 out of the 5
“good practices” under examination were
found to be unprofitable (B/C: 0.9 and
1), and one was found to be only slightly
profitable (B/C: 1.2). These data were
considered not fully reliable by project
staff, who eventually decided to go ahead
with implementation and replication of
the above good practices as planned. SPFS
staff in Jocotán became increasingly
involved in the program scaling-up
process, and spent most of their time in
start-up activities in second-phase project
sites. Thus, there was a decrease in on-
farm monitoring of good practices, techni-
cal assistance, extension, and in-kind sub-
sidies to participant farmers in Jocotán.
In light of the above, and with the aim
of getting a clearer picture of the socioe-
conomic impacts of good practices, SPFS
management promoted the aforemen-
tioned assessment. Based on a combina-
tion of ethnographic, economic, and par-
ticipatory research methods, this study
focused on the 2003–2004 agricultural sea-
son performance of “improved maize and
bean seed multiplication” and “green-
house vegetable production,” the 2 good
practices that were perceived as particular-
ly critical by local staff.
The findings of the economic analysis
were disappointing. Among sampled
adopters, the B/C ratio for “seed multipli-
cation” ranged from 0.2 to 1.7, with an
average of 0.8 (a loss); for “greenhouses”,
it ranged from 0.7 to 1.8, with an average
of 1.1 (a negligible profit). Findings sug-
gested that the 2003–2004 economic per-
formance of both good practices was not
only lower than expected, but also highly
variable, with some farmers getting signifi-
cant profits (B/C: 1.7–1.8) and others
ending with major losses (0.2–0.7). In
interviews and group discussions, partici-
pants ascribed this variability to the rela-
tive exposure to erratic natural risk fac-
tors, such as pests, frosts, dry-season water
shortages, and dengue disease. However,
there is also evidence to suggest that par-
ticipants living closer to project headquar-
FIGURE 4  Greenhouse vegetable
production: one of the best practices
identified. (Photo by Patrizio Warren)
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ters and with a higher likelihood of get-
ting technical assistance and extension
services performed better (and faced low-
er transaction costs) than those living in
the most remote aldeas, which the pro-
gram was no longer able to visit.
In light of the above findings, it is dif-
ficult to blame the Ch’orti’ for their cau-
tion in engaging in SPFS-promoted good
practices, and it is unfair to portray them
as “backward” conservative people. Like
many other rural people in the world, the
Ch’orti’ appear to be experienced and
wise managers of their scarce household
endowments. They are interested in test-
ing potentially profitable innovations, but
are also resistant to making major invest-
ments until these small-scale tests prove
successful and sustainable. Thus, risk aver-
sion is not part of the problem; it is part
of the strategy, allowing the campesinos to
survive in the unpredictable political ecol-
ogy of the Jocotán hills. It is also a very
detached way to deal with development
industry processes, which the Ch’orti’ per-
ceive as “hasty” (apuradas), “hectic” (accel-
eradas) and “very transient” (muy de paso).
Achieving the MDGs in Jocotán
There are obviously many initiatives that
the Government, international agencies,
and donors can take to improve campesino
livelihoods and eventually facilitate the
achievement of the MDGs in Jocotán (and
elsewhere in the Guatemalan uplands).
Serious land tenure reform and access to
water and other natural resources are
obvious priorities to reduce poverty and
seasonal food insecurity at the national
level. The Municipality might be assisted
in operating the integrated watershed
management and emergence prepared-
ness scheme, established by the Spanish
NGO Acción contra el Hambre in the after-
math of Hurricane Mitch. Imbalance in
downstream/upstream linkages within the
watershed might be corrected by introduc-
ing some form of payment for environ-
mental services to hillside campesinos.
Chor’ti’ household farming economies
could be revitalized and strengthened by
refining and validating incremental tech-
nologies and activities under tests (or
“under trial”), including some SPFS good
practices. Access to national and interna-
tional trading networks and commodity
chains can be facilitated, and the impact
on the local economy of the Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAF-
TA) buffered by appropriate marketing of
local products and rural tourism. Impor-
tantly, there is also scope for enhancing
education and health services and sup-
porting the Ch’orti’ women’s movement
against domestic violence and discrimina-
tion (Figure 5).
However, the case study described
here suggests that none of these actions
could be completed in a short time, nor
fit easily into the standard donor-assisted
five-year project format; none of them
would work without steady extension and
fieldwork; none of them can avoid engag-
ing in sound social impact monitoring.
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FIGURE 5  Ch’orti’ women mobilize against domestic violence. (Photo by Patrizio Warren)
